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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS JURISDICTION
This is a domestic law case for which an appeal lies directly to this Court pursuant to
the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(h). The Third District Court entered: (i) an Order of
Paternity and Related Matters dated March 3,2003 (Record pp. 406-412; Addendum No. 1,
pp. 1-7); (ii) an Order of Child Support and Judgment dated June 24,2003 (Record pp. 445447; Addendum No. 2, pp. 8-10); and (iii) an Order Pursuant to Petitioner's Motion for a
New Trial, dated June 24, 2003. (Record pp. 448-452; Addendum No. 4, pp. 16-18). The
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on the 16th day of July, 2003. (Record pp. 457-478).
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

The Issues Presented on Appeal.
1.

Whether the Order of Support as entered, is based upon Findings of Fact that
take into account the present earnings ability of the Petitioner?

2.

Whether or not the Court, based upon its Findings, could properly impute
income to the Petitioner where the Court found that there was not sufficient
evidence to establish the net earnings of the Petitioner from his self
employment on an historical as well as a current basis? This comparison
always is required by the provisions of UCA §78-45-7.5(5)(c)?

3.

Whether the Trial Court properly ruled (as a matter of law) that the father's
treating medical doctor (i.e. his psychiatrist) is not qualified to render an
opinion on the Petitioner's present occupational impairments and his impaired
ability to function in the legal profession or any other occupation?

4.

Whether the entry of a contribution money judgment in favor of the mother for
unpaid medical bills of the minor children should be vacated as a matter of law
because the mother has not yet paid more than her one-half QA) share?

5.

Whether the Court could properly enter any Finding of contempt in the
absence of the Respondent's compliance with the provisions of UCA §78-32-1
et. esq. as to the manner in which contempt is asserted and advance notice

required to be given to the offending party and the prior Order of the Court
that the claim be asserted by means of an Order to Show Cause proceeding?

B.

6.

Whether the Trial Court properly concluded that the Petitioner is guilty of civil
contempt and whether all of the elements of contempt have been established
and supported by adequate Findings of Fact?

7.

Whether the Petitioner has proven a prima facie defense to the claim of civil
contempt as a result of his present impaired medical condition as recognized
by UCA §78-32-17(3)?

8.

Whether the evidence ultimately establishes the claim of civil contempt by
clear and convincing evidence in light of the Court's ruling of the lack of
historic and current earnings of the Petitioner?

9.

Whether the Order of Support violates the provisions of UCA §78-45-7.18 by
exceeding more than 50% of the father's present disposable income?

10.

Whether the Trial Court correctly made the award of child support retroactive,
in violation of UCA §78-45-9.3(3) where there were no Findings made that the
Temporary Order of Support was obtained by fraud or by any false statements
of the Petitioner?

11.

Whether or not the present appeal should be dismissed or stayed due to the
Petitioner's failure to comply with his ongoing child support obligations
imposed by the Trial Court?

The Standard of Review on Appeal as to the Issues on Appeal
1.

The Court should review the Third District Court's rulings on legal issues
under the "correction of error" standard. Malibu Investment Company v.
Kathv Sparks 2000 UT 30, T[12, 996 P.2d 1043; TRF v. Rav Felan 760 P.2d
906 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); R. Owen Neerings v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320
(Utah 1991).

2.

The Court reviews the ultimate application of law to any proven or forward set
of facts under the "correction of error" standard.

3.

The Court reviews disputed evidence and the resulting Findings of Fact made
with respect thereto under the "clearly erroneous standard".
-2-

IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Statutory Provisions:
1.

UCA §78-32-1. Acts and Omissions Constituting Contempt.
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court:
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court.

2.

UCA §78-32-12.1. Compensatory Service for Violation of Parenttime order or
Failure to Pay Child Support.
(5) If a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that an obligor,
as defined in Section 78-45-2, has refused to pay child support as ordered by
a court in accordance with Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, the court shall order the obligor to:
(a) perform a minimum often hours of compensatory service;
and
(b) participate in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to
educate the obligor about the importance of complying with the
court order and providing the children with a regular and stable
source of support. (Emphasis Added).

3.

UCA §78-32-17. Noncompliance with Child Support Order.
(1) When a court of competent jurisdiction, or the Office of Recovery
Services pursuant to an action under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, makes an order requiring a parent to furnish support or
necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or other remedial care for his
child, and the parent fails to do so, proof of noncompliance shall be prima
facie evidence of contempt of court.
(2) Proof on noncompliance may be demonstrated by showing that:
(a) the order was made, and filed with the district court; and

-3-

(b) the parent knew of the order because:
(i) the order was mailed to the parent at his last-known
address as shown on the court records;
(ii) the parent was present in court at the same time the
order was pronounced;
(iii) the parent entered into a written stipulation and the
parent or counsel for the parent was sent a copy of the
order;
(iv) counsel was present in court and entered into a
stipulation which was accepted and the order based upon
the stipulation was then sent to counsel for the parent; or
(v) the parent was properly served and failed to answer.
(3) Upon establishment of a prima facie case of contempt under
Subsection (2), the obligor under the child support order has the burden of
proving inability to comply with the child support order. (Emphasis Added).
UCA §78-45-7.1. Medical Expenses of Dependant Children - Assigning
Responsibility for Payment - Insurance Coverage - Income Withholding.
The court shall include the following in its order:
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable
and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children;
UCA §78-45-7.15. Medical Expenses.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable
and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and
copayments, incurred for the dependent children. (Emphasis Added).
UCA §78-45- 7.5. Determination of Gross Income - Imputed Income.
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent
stipulates to the amount imputed, the party defaults, or , in contested cases, a
-4-

hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed
or underemployed. (Emphasis Added).
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons
of similar backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for
persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found
in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is
unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum
wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to evidentiary basis
for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed in any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor
children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home. (Emphasis Added).
UCA §78-45-7.18. Limitation on Amount of Support Ordered.
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's
adjusted income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support would
exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted income, the presumption under Section
78-45-7.17 is rebutted.
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8.

UCC §78-45-9.3. Payment Under Child Support Order - Judgement
(3) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support under any
child support order, as defined by Section 78-45-2, is, on and after the date it
is due;
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of any
judgment of a district court, except as provided in Subsection
(4);
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to fixll faith and credit in this and in
any other jurisdiction; and
(c) not subject to retroactive modification by this or any other
jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (4). (Emphasis
Added).
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

The Nature of the Case.
Mr. David Beazer filed a paternity action against the Respondent, Jenee Farnsworth,

in September, 1999. The parties have two (2) children of their relationship. The matter was
tried to the Court on January 25, 2002. The Court awarded the mother physical custody of
the children and granted visitation rights to the father. Custody and visitation rights were not
contested in the case. This is a case of child support and how it must be determined.
B.

The Course of the Proceedings in the Trial Court.
The Appellant (i.e. the father) filed a Paternity Action in the Third District Court on

the 10th day of September, 1999. The case then sat idle for about one (1) year without any
further action being taken by either party. The parties were once engaged to be married. The
relationship between the parties began to sour and finally terminated in April of 2000. The
-6-

Respondent began to see other men. The Petitioner suffered a mental breakdown due to the
gradual deterioration of the relationship. Since the onset of his mental illness, the Petitioner
has had no meaningful income, jobs, or assets. He is dependent upon others for his own
support.
The Respondent eventually sought out financial assistance from the State. On the 2&
day of September, 2000, the Office of Recovery Services filed a Motion for intervention
which was granted. (Record pp. 19-20). The Appellee (i.e. the mother) filed a Motion for
Temporary Support and Related Matters on the 11th day of October, 2000. The Appellant
(i.e. the father) filed a Motion for an Order to Conduct Paternity Testing the 7 * day of
November, 2000. A paternity test was conducted and it was determined that the Petitioner
was the father of the two (2) minor children.
A one (1) day bench trial was held on the 25th day of January, 2002. The father filed
a Motion for a New Trial on the 12th day of March, 2003, and the Motion was heard on the
9th day of June, 2003. The Trial Court entered the Order of Child Support and Judgment on
June 23,2003. The Order, pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial, was denied
on June 24, 2003. The present appeal was then filed with the Third District Court on July
16,2003. (Record pp. 457-478).
C.

Disposition of the case in the Trial Court.
The Trial Court, in its Order of Paternity and Related Matters, determined that the

Petitioner was the biological father of three (3) minor children with the Respondent, one (1)
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ofwhich was stillborn. (Recordpp. 406-412; Addendum No. 1). The District Court awarded
the mother sole physical custody of the minor children with reasonable rights of visitation
for the father when he was in Utah. David Beazer is both a Canadian citizen and a United
States citizen. Because of the father's medical condition, custody and visitation matters were
not materially contested. (Record pp. 392-405; Addendum No. 5, p.21). The District Court
ordered that the out-of-pocket child care expenses, health insurance costs, and medical
expenses for the minor children were to be shared equally (50/50) as per the governing
contribution statute. These types of expenses are to be reimbursed by the other parent within
ten (10) days upon presentation of the necessary verification of the cost and any payment of
the same. The Respondent was awarded a contribution money judgment against the
Petitioner in the amount of $4,627.32 representing 50% of the birth related expenses incurred
by the minor children. (Record p. 409; Addendum No. 1, p. 4). These unpaid medical
liabilities are actually owed to third parties. The Respondent was not out-of-pocket for any
of these unpaid medical expenses. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110-112). The District Court
also awarded the Respondent a money judgment against the Petitioner for unpaid child
support in the amount of $2,000.00, and attorney's fees for the contempt claim in the amount
of $450.00, for a total money judgment liability of $7,077.32. (Record pp. 409-410;
Addendum No. 1, pp. 4-5). The Order of Paternity and Related Matters provided that the
Petitioner owed the Respondent child support from September 1999 forward, but the dollar
amount was not then specified by the Court. (Record p. 410; Addendum No. 1, p. 5).
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The Trial Court entered an Order of Child Support and Judgment, dated June 23,
2003, in which the Court determined that the child support obligation should be set at
$1,239.00 per month based upon the median income of lawyers in the Salt Lake City area.
This Order retroactively modified the existing Order of support in the sum of $394.00 per
month. (Record pp. 410 and 446; Addendum No. 1, p.5; Addendum No. 2, p.9; Addendum
No. 19, p. 116-119). The Court determined that the child support should be made retroactive
and should commence with the month of September, 1999. The Court then entered a money
judgment in favor of the Appellee in the amount of $55,755.00 representing child support
arrearages against the Appellant ($1,239.00 times 45 months) for the month of September
1999 through and including May 2003. (Record p. 447; Addendum No. 2, p. 9).
The $2,000.00 support judgment was not vacated when the support was made
retroactive. The Respondent received both awards.
The Trial Court entered a final Order, the Order pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion
for a New Trial, in which the Court denied the Appellant's Motion for a New Trial in its
entirety. (Record p. 448-452; Addendum No. 4, pp. 16-18).
The Court determined that the Petitioner should be held in contempt for not paying
his support obligations. The Respondent never initiated any civil action seeking a citation
of contempt by means of an Order to Show Cause as required by UCA §78-32-1 et. seq. or
under UCA §78-32-17 (dealing with child support orders).
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VI. RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
For purposes of the present appeal, the following core facts were established at trial:
1.

The Appellant, David Beazer, at the time of the trial, was residing with his

parents in their home in Leffbridge, Alberta, Canada. (Trial Transcript pp. 15-16).
2.

At the time the Paternity Petition was filed, the Petitioner had not yet

experienced the acute onset of his catastrophic mental illness. (Record p. 485; Kotkas Dep.
p. 39). The mental illness became acute in February of 2000 and was deemed severe by the
month of August, 2000. (Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. pp. 9-1 land 39).
3.

The Petitioner filed a Petition to determine Paternity and Custody on or about

September 10,1999. (Record pp. 1-5). By stipulation, the parties cooperated in DNA testing
as to paternity of the minor children involved in this case. (Record pp. 35-36, 50-52, 77-83;
Addendum No. 5 p. 20).
4.

The results of the genetic testing filed by the State of Utah on or about January

4,2001, showed with a substantial probability that the Petitioner is the father of the children,
namely: (i) Isabella Hatton born September 14,1998; and(ii) Sterling Hatton born March 18,
2000. (Record pp. 77-83; Addendum No. 1, p.2). The Court found the Appellant to be the
biological father of these two (2) children. (Record p. 393; Addendum No. 5, p. 20).
Additionally, the Court found that the parties had a third child together, namely: Savannah
Hatton who was born on October 23, 1997. (Record p. 393; Addendum No. 5, p. 20;
Finding %L).
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5.

The Court ordered that the out-of-pocket expenses for the birthing expenses

of the third child should be shared equally (50/50) as between the parents. (Record p. 408;
Addendum No. 1, p. 4).
6.

The Respondent has not paid any of the medical expenses incurred that are

represented in the contribution money judgment liabilities. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110112).
7.

Before the parties terminated their relationship, David paid a significant portion

of the medical expenses of the children. (Trial Transcript p. 73). This eventually stopped
altogether after the onset of the mental illness.
8.

The parties were engaged to be married. A proposal of marriage was made and

accepted. (Trial Transcript p. 55). It is conceded that at this time, the Petitioner's mental
health was relatively good.
9.

While the relationship was good, the Petitioner voluntarily supported his

children. The Petitioner had paid $5,000.00 to the Respondent for the support of the
children. (Trial Transcript pp. 113-114). The Petitioner has also paid portions of other
medical bills for the dependent children. (Trial Transcript pp. 122-123).
10.

The Court eventually entered a Child Support Order pursuant to the

Respondent's Motion for Support and Related Matters on or about April 17,2001. The level
of child support was based upon Ms. Hatton's income of $0.00 and Mr. Beazer's income of
$1,422.00 per month based on a pro forma 2000 U.S. Federal Income Tax Return. (Record
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pp. 86-91,393; Addendum No. 5, p.20). As such, the Court ordered Mr. Beazer to pay child
support for the two (2) minor children in the amount of $394.00 per month. (Record pp.134137). [Note: The 2000 tax return in the file was filled out and signed.]
11.

The deposition of Dr. Lawrence John Kotkas, dated January 3, 2002, was

reviewed and received by the Court. (Record pp. 394-396; Addendum No. 5, pp. 22-24; Trial
Transcript p. 152). Dr. Kotkas was unable to appear in person at trial and that as such, the
publication of his testimony should be entered in lieu of testimony. (Record p. 394;
Addendum No. 5, p. 21; Trial Transcript pp. 5-9).
12.

At trial, the parties agreed that no appearance was necessary by counsel Jeff

Hunt representing the Office of Recovery Services. Further it was stipulated that the exhibit
prepared by Mr. Hunt would be admitted. (Record pp. 394-395; Addendum No. 5, pp. 2122). The Exhibit consisted of a January 24, 2002, letter to both counsel with attachments
setting forth the position of the State of Utah (as a party) on the issue of income
determination of the Petitioner for the calculation of child support in this case. (Addendum
No. 13, pp. 81-93). The attachments included some statistical financial information from the
State of Utah, Department of Workforce Services, (i) disclosing the median income for
attorneys in the State of Utah for the year 1998, (ii) a 1099 Form dated 1998 showing the
gross receipts paid to the Appellant by Dental Select, and (iii) a response from Brighton Bank
showing the balance of the Appellant's business accounts dated June 19, 1999. (Record p.
394-395; Addendum No. 5, pp. 21-22; Addendum No. 13, pp. 81-93).

-12-

13.

The District Court ultimately determined that the Petitioner should be required

to pay child support to the Respondent. The father's occupational earnings ability was that
of an attorney.

The Court also found that the Petitioner was unemployed (i.e.

underemployed) and suffered from severe clinical depression and phobic anxiety that
prevented him from working. (Record p. 395-397; Addendum No. 5, pp. 22-25).
14.

The relationship between the partied finally ended on April 6, 2000. (Trial

Transcript p. 55). Prior to February 2000 and while the relationship continued, the Petitioner
was functional and was not mentally impaired. (Trial Transcript p. 77). The Petitioner was
living in a trailer for 1 Vi years prior to his mental breakdown. (Trial Transcript p. 39; Record
p. 485; Kotkas Depo. p. 39).
15.

The Petitioner was diagnosed with clinical depression, panic attacks, and

phobic anxiety. These conditions were described as being "severe". (Record p. 485; Kotkas
Depo. pp. 25-27 and 38-42).
16.

The Petitioner was not working as a lawyer or otherwise on the date his parents

picked him up and returned him to Canada to be under their care. (Trial Transcript p. 38).
17.

Stress aggravates the mental illness. (Recordp. 485; Kotkas Depo. p. 25). The

Petitioner was suffering from the usual consequences of mental illness. (Kotkas Depo. pp.
27, 34-36, and 38-42). The father was diagnosed as being severely ill, both physically and
mentally, by August of 2000 with an acute onset of the condition earlier in the year. (Kotkas
Depo. pp. 11-12).
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18.

The father's medical and emotional problems included at least the following:

(i) trouble breathing (Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. p. 12); (ii) panic attacks (Kotkas Depo.
p. 12); (iii) anxiety attacks (Kotkas Depo. p. 14); (iv) low methemgoblin (Kotkas Depo. p.
14); (iv) autoimmune thyroiditis (Kotkas Depo. pp. 14-15); (v) clinical mental depression
(Kotkas Depo. p. 16); (vi) phobic anxiety (Kotkas Depo. p. 16); (vii) dyspnea (Kotkas Depo.
p. 17); (viii) concerns about suicide (Kotkas Depo. p. 30); (ix) racing heart beat (Kotkas
Depo. p. 18); and (x) inability to care for himself. (Kotkas Depo. p. 41).
19.

Harry Beazer, the Petitioner's father, described his son's condition as follows:

(i) David now lives with his parents (Trial Transcript p. 11); (ii) Jenee broke off the
engagement (Trial Transcript pp. 13 and 55); (iii) Days and nights are now reversed (Trial
Transcriptp. 14); (iv) Parents provide for David's needs (Trial Transcript pp. 15,31 and 35):
(v) David lives in a dark basement room (Trial Transcript p. 15); (vi) David is depressed and
returned to Canada to be with his parents (Trial Transcript pp. 15-16); (vii) Parents were in
fear of their son's death (Trial Transcript p. 16); (viii) David has no job and has had no job
since his move to Canada (Trial Transcript pp. 16 and 31); (ix) David has a short attention
span (Trial Transcript p. 17); (x) Parents monitor his use of medications (Trial Transcript p.
18); (xi) Parents pay for David's medical insurance because he has no income (Trial
Transcript p. 19); (xii) David cannot perform basic chores of the household (Trial Transcript
pp. 35 and 37); (xiii) David does not go out and shop (Trial Transcript p. 38); (xiv) David
takes various anti-depressants (Trial Transcript p. 40); (xv) David cannot travel without an

-14-

escort (Trial Transcript p. 46); and (xvi) David cannot drive his own car (Trial Transcript
p. 37).
20.

The Petitioner has experienced a major mental breakdown. (Record p. 485;

Kotkas Depo. p. 58). His condition, in January of 2002, is described as being severe.
(Record p. 485, Kotkas Depo. p. 38).
21.

The Petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Kotkas, testified in his deposition that

the Petitioner has severe clinical depression, panic attacks, and phobic anxiety as a result of
his difficulties in his relationship with the Respondent. Dr. Kotkas testified that the
Petitioner has a serious impairment and is not able to work and will not likely be able to work
for possibly another two (2) years as a result of his mental illness. (Record p. 485; Kotkas
Depo. pp. 25, 39, and 40).
22.

Dr. Kotkas also testified that the Petitioner was often not properly groomed,

and rarely came out of his basement bedroom. Dr. Kotkas stated that a relationship break-up
can cause mental illness for life and if it were not for the Petitioner's family the Petitioner
would likely be dead. (Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. pp. 21, 25, and 28).
23.

The Court determined that the Petitioner is capable to being employed as an

attorney, but acknowledged that he is not so employed at the time of the trial. (Record p.
397; Addendum No. 5, p. 24).
24.

The Court determined that the Petitioner is voluntarily unemployed within the

meaning of UCA §78-45-7.5. The Court determined that there was no persuasive evidence
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that the Petitioner is unable to work despite the expert medical testimony of Dr. Kotkas as
to the Petitioner's present medical and occupational condition. (Record p. 398-399;
Addendum No. 5, pp. 25-26, 38-40).
25.

The Court imputed income to the Petitioner. The gross imputed income of the

Petitioner was based on the median earnings for persons engaged in the practice of law in
Salt Lake City, Utah. The child support obligation was then set at $1,239.00 per month.
(Respondent's Trial Exhibit No. 24; Addendum No. 16, pp. 106-107). The child support
obligations was then made effective from the day that the Paternity Petition was filed by the
Petitioner in September, 1999. (Record p. 446; Addendum No. 2, p. 9).
26.

Although the parties agreed on the amount of the unpaid birth and medical

related expenses of the minor children in the amount of $9,254.65, there was a dispute as to
how those expenses should be shared and it was acknowledged by the Respondent that the
expenses had not been paid by the mother. The Court, nonetheless, awarded the Respondent
a money judgment against the Petitioner for one-half (V2) the current outstanding amount
which is $4,627.32, although the Mother has not paid more than her one-half QA) of the
expenses. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110-112; Record p. 409; Addendum No. 1, p. 4).
27.

The Petitioner's parent's have made six (6) or seven (7) child support payments

during the pendency of the matter between February, 2001, and July, 2001, and those
payments totaled $907.01. Those support payments were made by the paternal grandparents.
(Trial Transcript pp.22, 31 and 50; Addendum No. 8, pp. 54-59).
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28.

The mother failed to deposit the voluntary child support payments received

from the grandparents until they were deposited in a lump sum transcript. The checks were
not cashed for many months. (Trial Transcript p. 120).
29.

The mother did not initiate an Order to Show Cause proceeding seeking to hold

the father in contempt. (Index of Record of the Proceedings). Such was ordered by the
District Court. (Record pp. 134-137; Addendum No. 19, p. 116-119).
30.

The Petitioner was found in contempt for his failure to pay the support under

the initial Support Order of the Court, which required that the father pay $394.00 per month
effective November 1, 2000. (Record p. 401; Addendum No. 5, p. 27A). The Respondent
was awarded her costs and $450.00 in attorney's fees in connection with the contempt
citation. (Record p. 401; Addendum No. 5, p. 27A).
31.

The Court determined that the medical expenses and medical insurance costs

for the minor children are to be shared by the parties according to UCA §78-45-7.15. The
parents are also to share equally (50/50) in the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually
paid. (Record pp. 408-409; Addendum No. 1, pp. 3-4).
VII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

The child support award was made incorrectly and based upon an improper

application of the law as to the found facts of the case.
B.

The Trial Court erroneously ruled that the Petitioner's psychiatrist was not

competent to render an opinion as to the ability of the Petitioner to work in a law related field
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or any other type of employment. This ruling of law has a profound effect upon all aspects
of the case.
C.

With respect to the issues of contempt, the Court (i) failed to obtain jurisdiction

over the Petitioner as to the claim, because no Order to Show Cause proceeding was initiated
as required by the prior Order of the Court; (ii) the Court failed to enter specific Findings of
Fact on all elements of the claim; and (iii) failed to apply the defense of inability to comply
with the support order.
D.

The Trial Court improperly entered a money judgment for contribution

purposes without finding specifically that the Respondent has paid more than her share of the
medical expenses of the children. The evidence at trial was that she made no payments at
all, let alone payments in excess of her share.
E.

The Trial Court entered an Order of Support which exceeds more than 50% of

the Petitioner's net monthly income in violation of UCA §78-45-7.18.
F.

The Court improperly modified the child support orders by retroactively

increasing it from $394.00 per month to $1,236.00 per month in violation of UCA §78-457.18.
G.

The present appeal should not be dismissed or stayed due to the Petitioner's

inability to comply with the current support obligations. There are significant reasons for his
inability to comply.
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VIII. ARGUMENT
The Incontroverted Testimony of a Competent and
Knowledgeable Witness must be Accepted as True Absent
Specific Findings or Evidence to the Contrary.
It is fairly well established that the Trial Court can accord any weight it deems
appropriate to expert testimony and is not bound to follow the recommendations or findings
so long as the Court's ultimate ruling is based upon competent evidence. Debra Martinez v.
Ed V. Martinez 652 P.2d 934 (Utah 1982); Cheri Tucker v. James Tucker 910 P.2d 1209
(Utah 1996).
However, it is also a generally accepted rule of law that when a witness testifies (or
provides evidence) as to any fact and the testimony of the witness is not discredited by other
competent evidence, and where the testimony itself is not improbable, then the testimony of
the witness is to be accepted as true by the Court. This rule of law is particularly important
in this case where the testimony of each witness as to the Petitioner's medical condition is
fully corroborated by other evidence. 30Am.Jur.2d

Evidence, §1083; 81 Am.Jur.2d

Witnesses. §660; Alvena L. West v. Sinclair 90 F.Supp 307 (DC WD Mo. 1950); Wichita
Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner 47-1 USTC1J9253, 162F.2d513 (CA-10 1947).
The Court in the West v. Sinclair case stated the rule of law as follows:
"It is the duty of the Court and the jury in every case to view the testimony
upon the theory that the witnesses are telling the truth."
In this case, the Respondent's position is that the medical condition is feigned and is
not a significant medical matter. (Trial Transcript pp. 170-172). Obviously, this means the
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Court must reject the testimony of Harry Beazer and Dr. Kotkas. In this case, Harry Beazer
and Dr. Kotkas provided competent evidence as to the current medical condition of David
Beazer as a result of his mental breakdown.
In this case, it is acknowledged that the mother has not interacted with the Petitioner
since April of 2000 except for a single attempt at visitation when the Petitioner was brought
to Utah by Harry Beazer so that the father could visit his children.
In this case, the Trial Court failed to enter clear and detailed findings of fact and
separate conclusions of law. (Record pp. 392-405, Addendum No. 5, pp. 19-31). In the
Findings prepared for the Court's adoption by the Respondent's lawyer, the factual findings
and legal rulings of law are intermixed and are not separately stated as required by Rule
52(a). This makes the review of the Court's actions and rulings more difficult to evaluate.
The Court did not find the testimony of these two (2) persons improbable or unbelievable.
The Trial Court Erred in its Determination that the
Petitioner is Willfully Underemployed.
The Petitioner's medical condition, at the time of the trial, is of critical importance.
It has a significant impact on nearly every issue raised in this case. There is no finding that
the mental illness itself was self-inflicted.
In its Finding of Facts and Conclusion of Law, the Trial Court determined that the
Petitioner was willfully underemployed at the time of the trial. (Record p. 398-399;
Addendum No. 5, p. 23). This is actually a legal conclusion which must be based upon the
evidence. Clear evidence was presented to the Court by both Dr. Kotkas (a person whom the
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Court recognized expert in the field of psychiatry) and also by Mr. Harry Beazer (the
Petitioner's father) as to the mental capacity and present physical inabilities of the Petitioner
to work. The Respondent presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of either Dr.
Kotkas or Mr. Harry Beazer as to his then existing medical condition. The good mental
health status of the Petitioner, while the parties were on good terms and contemplating
marriage, is not evidence that the condition could not and did not change in 2000. In deed,
the Court's findings indicate that the mental illness was bona fide. The Court simply ruled
(as a matter of law) that the medical expert has no training to determine the ability of the
Petitioner to work as a lawyer either in Canada or in the United States. The doctor's training
and experience is significant. (Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. pp. 5-6).
The rebutting evidence offered in the case was limited to his mental status and
earnings ability prior to the date of his mental breakdown during the year 2000. The
Respondent presented no medical or other evidence contradicting his present medical illness
or its severity. The doctor's deposition was taken just a month prior to the trial. It was a
current report of the father's mental health status. The Respondent counters by presenting
evidence of historical earnings as if that indicates that the current mental health is not
genuine.
The financial evidence presented by the Respondent consisted of: (i) 1099's for the
calendar years 1998 and 1999; (ii) the Respondent's Trial Exhibit Nos. 19, 23-24; (iii) the
Supplemental Information contained in the wage information for attorneys and receptionists;
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and (iv) the letter and supporting Exhibits provided by the Office of Recovery Services, via.
Jeffrey C. Hunt, for lawyers of the year 2000. (Addendum No. 7, pp. 47-53; Addendum No.
12, p. 80; Addendum No. 13, pp. 81-93; Addendum No. 14, pp. 94-95; Addendum No. 15,
pp. 96-105). This evidence does not establish what the Petitioner'scurrent net earnings are
in light of the Petitioner's mental illness.
There was no evidence offered by the Respondent as to the earnings ability of the
Petitioner for the calendar years 2000 and 2001 other than the Department of Labor's
Statistical Report.
The Petitioner's own Financial Declaration Form of May, 2001, showed no current
earnings. (Record pp. 140-145; Addendum No. 11, pp. 74-79).
The Trial Court can determine the weight that it should give to the testimony of any
particular witness, but it must do so in the light of all the surrounding and supporting
evidence presented. K. Russell Myers v. Tawyna Myers 768 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct.App. 1989);
State v. Thomas A. Shickles 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). There was no current medical
evidence presented to rebut Dr. Kotkas' expert medical analysis of the capacity of the
Petitioner to function in any work environment, let alone perform in the capacity of a lawyer.
The Doctor clearly stated that the Petitioner is too mentally disturbed to do any type of work.
(Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. pp. 3 8-41). The Doctor's medical diagnosis was that of severe
depression and the prognosis was that is was a long term mental illness. (Kotkas Depo. pp.
38- 40). The illness was not brought on due to any fault of the patient, but it can have a
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profound lifetime effect. (Record p. 485; Kotkas Depo. pp. 72-73).
The Amount of Gross Income Attributed to the Petitioner by
the Trial Court was Improper Since the Respondent Failed to
Provide Specific Proof as to the Historical and Current Income
Earning Ability of the Petitioner.
The Court's own Findings of Fact states that there is no sufficient evidence regarding
the earnings of the Petitioner. (Record pp. 398-399; Addendum No. 5, pp. 25-26).
The amount of child support to be paid in a case depends upon the income of the
parties. Verification of the current and historic earnings of the parents is mandatory. UCA
§78-45-7.5(5)(b).

Historical and current earnings are to be compared by the Court to

determine, if under-employmentor over-employment exists in any given case. UCA §78-457.5(5)(c). Where aperson is self-employed or operates a business, gross income includes the
gross receipts of the business less its necessary business expenses. UCA §78-45-7.5(4)(a).
No allowance at all was made by the Court in its Findings for any expenses which are
necessarily incurred in any law practice. Gross receipts and net income are not the same.
In the Courts's Findings of Fact ^[16, the Court based its income computation upon
a finding of the lack of evidence as to the recent earnings of the Petitioner and incomplete
evidence as to historical earnings. (Record p. 399; Addendum No. 5, p. 26). This Finding
of willful underemployment is clearly improper where the necessary evidence to make such
a finding is supposedly lacking. The evidence, as to the Petitioner's current income (aside
from the testimony of Harry Beazer and Dr. Kotkas), is the Financial Declaration Form.
(Recordp. 140-145; Addendum No. 11, pp. 74-79). The finding of underemployment cannot
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be made where the reason for the lack of current earnings is the mental illness of the parent.
UCA §78-45-7.5(6) and (7) provides that gross income cannot be imputed to a parent
unless: (i) the parent stipulates to the amount; or (ii) a hearing is held and a finding is made
that a person is either underemployed or voluntarily unemployed. UCA §78-45-7.5(7)(d)
further provides that income cannot be imputed where the parent is physically or mentally
disabled to the extent he cannot earn a minimum wage. In this case, the medical condition
of impairment is severe.
The Court's Findings, in ^fll as to income of $4,511.00 per month in 1998 from
Dental Select, is based upon the income derived from Dental Select is clearly in error.
(Record p. 397; Addendum No. 5, p. 24). This income is the Petitioner's grossreceipts and
not his net income. This 1998 figure is derived by simply dividing his gross receipts over the
nine (9) months in which it was earned.
The Petitioner presented expert testimony of his treating psychiatrist as to his mental
disability and the fact that he cannot presently work in any capacity. (Record p. 485; Kotkas
Depo. pp. 38-39). The Court must determine "current earnings" before it can even compare
it to "historical earnings". Additional evidence was presented by the Petitioner's father (i.e..
Harry Beazer) that the medical condition was severe and which substantiated the doctor's
testimony. No evidence was offered by the Respondent that contradicted this medical
evidence as to his present earnings ability. The Trial Court clearly ruled against the weight
of the evidence in its determination that the father should have an imputed income of
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$7,940.00 per month. (Addendum No. 16, p. 107). There is no evidence that the Petitioner
ever earned such a net monthly income on a regular basis. The rate of $7,940.00 per month
was used to set the child support amount on both a prospective and retroactive basis.
An Order of Support
Cannot be Retroactively Modified.
As a general rule of law, an award of support (whether in the form of child support
or spousal support) cannot be modified retroactively by the Court in the absence of fraud.
Jefferv LeRov Whitehead v. Elizabeth Ann Whitehead 836 P.2d 814 (Utah Ct.App. 1992);
Gary K. Shelton v. Jervlin A. Shelton 885 P.2d 807 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). This treatment is
set forth in the provisions of UCA §78-45-9.3(3).
In this case, there are no Findings made that suggest that the initial support award was
obtained by fraud. The Court made no findings that indicate the existence of compelling
reasons to change the support order on a retroactive basis. There was an error of law and in
violation of UCA §78-45-9.3(3).
The Order of Support Violates the Provisions
ofUCA§78-45-7.18.
UCA §78-45-7.18 provides that an Order of Support cannot exceed 50% of the
obligors adjusted gross income. In this case, the support obligation for the two (2) minor
children was set as $1,236.00 per month. On top of this is added the ongoing medical and
daycare expense contribution obligation of the Petitioner as well as the money judgments
rendered.
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The time of the trial, the Petitioner had no earnings. He had no job. He was
occupationally disabled. The Order of Support clearly exceeds 50% of his available income.
The Petitioner cannot care for himself. He cannot presently provide financial assistance for
his children. This is not to say the children are not in need. It is simply a fact that the
Petitioner cannot generate support for anyone.
The Trial Court Committed and Error in Rendering a Money
Judgment in Favor of the Respondent for Unpaid Medical Bills.
The Trial Court adopted the mandatory State statute as to the sharing of the medical
expenses by the parents on an equal basis. (Record pp. 408-409; Addendum No. 1, pp. 3-4).
UCA §78-45-7.15(5) in substance creates aright of financial contribution as between parents
for medical expenses incurred for the benefit of their dependent children.
The legal principle or doctrine respecting the right of contribution is based upon the
principle of equality and the required bearing of a common burden or common debt by the
obligors. Hugh Gardner v. David D. Bean 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1984). As a basic rule of
equity, persons who have or who have a legal duty to bear a common burden are legally
obligated to share in the actual cost of the burden's discharge. This is a basic common law
principle and it is the foundation of the legal doctrine as embraced by the statute.
The law of "contribution" is the legal process or procedure by which one person
obtains reimbursement from another person or entity for a proportionate share of an
obligation actually paid by the first, but for which they are both jointly liable for either at law
or in equity. See 18 Am.Jur.2dContribution, §51; Hugh Gardner v. David D. Bean 677 P.2d
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1116 (Utah 1984). It has long been held that the cause of action for equitable contribution
can arise only after the party's payments or credits have exceeded his proportionate share of
the total debt or obligation. Daniel Durbin v. Kunev & Savers 19 Or. 71, 23 P. 661 (Oreg.
1890). The Court improperly applied the statute to the facts of this case.
The Right of Contribution Does Not Occur Until a
Claimant has Paid More Than an Equitable Share.
It has been stated that the equitable right of contribution is a contingent right. Ernst
v. Conrad Nau's Estate 23 N.W. 492 (Wise. 1885). The cause of action does not arise or
does not become fixed and enforceable until one has paid more than his share of the debt or
common burden. 18 Am.Jur.2dContribution, §9 and §50; Mary E. Brown v. E.E. Brown 58
Ariz. 333, 119 P.2d 938 (Ariz. 1941) (referencing the American Jurisprudence Rule and
stating that contribution is due if one has been compelled to pay more than his or her share
of a joint liability). It has been held by some Courts that the right of contribution is a
derivative right and not a separate cause of action. Oahu RY & Land v. USA 73 F.Supp 707
(DC Hawaii 1947); Baltimore Transit v. The State 138 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (MD Ct.App.
1944).
A basic rule of equity jurisprudence is that a legal or equitable right of contribution
does not arise until the person has paid more than his fair share or allocable portion of the
obligation. H.R. Jackson v. Emma L. Lacv 100 P.2d 313 (Cali. 1940) (holding that a party
acquires a right to contribution as soon as he pays more than his share but not until then);
Charles Richter v. A. Henningsan

110 Cal. 530, 42 P. 1077 (Cali. 1895); E.L. Cipra v.
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George C. Seeger215 Kan. 95L 529 P.2d 130 fKan. 1974): Hugh Gardner v. David D. Bean
677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1984). The provisions of UCA §78-45-7.1 and §78-45-7.15(5)
embodied this equitable concept and puts it in the form of a statutory duty.
In this case, it was acknowledged by the Respondent during the trial that she has not
yet paid more than her share of the medical expenses. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110-112).
In fact, she has paid none of these expenses . She has no claim on which a judgment can be
obtained.
The Courts ruling is to share the medical expenses equally. No factual findings were
made that justify a right of "exoneration" as opposed to the statutory right of financial
contribution. The Court adopted the proper contribution law, but then incorrectly applied it
to the facts of this case.
A Party Seeking Contribution Must Present Evidence
to Satisfy the Four (4) Elements of a Prima Facie Case.
To sustain a prima facie claim for financial contribution, the party seeking equitable
contribution must produce evidence to establish: (i) that a joint debt or joint burden existed;
(ii) that the party seeking contribution has paid more than his or her proportionate share of
the debt or burden; (iii) that the opposing party did not pay his or her appropriate share; and
(iv) that the party seeking contribution paid more than the opposing party on the debt or
burden. DBL Collection Trust v. Gary S. Harris 893 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (holding
that the party seeking contribution bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case); Hugh
Gardner v. David D. Bean 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1984) (establishing the necessary elements
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of a prima facie case for equitable financial contribution).
The mother failed, as a matter of law, to establish a prima facie right to a money
judgment for contribution. In this case, the evidence was clear that the mother had not yet
paid more than her share of the medical expenses. (Trial Transcript pp. 71, 110-112). She
has not satisfied this critical element. No Findings were made that show how the Respondent
has already paid more than 50% of the medical bills of the children. The State of Utah made
no such claim and so such relief was granted.
Exoneration is a Separate Claim or Doctrine
and Arises Our of Different Principles.
The law of exoneration does not apply in this case and was not adopted by the Court
in its final Order. There are no Findings made which would invoke this legal doctrine.
Exoneration describes an order compelling an obligor to pay the full amount of the obligation
and usually directly to a creditor (or authorizing payment out of a fund or other security
committed to the satisfaction of the obligation). Hugh Gardner v. David D. Bean 677 P.2d
1116 (Utah 1984). Payment, pursuant to such an Order, would exonerate a person who
would otherwise be compelled to make payment and then take action against the other
obligors for reimbursement for the money paid out. Glades County v. Detroit Fidelity &
Surety Co. 57 F.2d 449 (CA-5 1932); American Casualty Co. v. Town of Shattuck. OK 228
F.Supp 834 (DC WD Okla. 1964).
The legal doctrine provides a legal remedy to a party to compel the other party to pay
the entire debt then due. Hugh Gardner v. David D. Bean 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1984). The
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Court's order was to share medical and birthing expenses. The money judgment in favor of
the Respondent must be vacated, because exoneration cannot be applied until the claimant
has paid some money towards the obligation. Exoneration does not mean the claimant is
entitled to a judgment liability, because he could be compelled the debt in full.
The Utah Code Enumerates Various Acts and Omissions
Which Can Amount to Contempt of Court.
In this case, the Court cited the Petitioner for contempt of Court. The is not clear from
the Court's conclusions of law which statute the contempt was based upon.
UCA §78-32-1 describes various acts and omissions that constitute contempt of court.
The more important acts and omissions are noted below. The text of the state statute reads
in part as follows:
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings
therein are contempts of the authority of the court:
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court.
The Courts have also held that even in the absence of state statutes on the subject, the
power to hold a person in contempt is an inherent judicial power that resides with the Courts.
In Re: Evans 42 Ut. 282, 130 P. 217 (Utah 1913).
It is not clear if the contempt is being asserted under: (i) UCA §78-32-1(5); (ii) UCA
§78-32-12.1(5); or (iii) UCA §78-32-17(1) and (2). The reason for this conclusion is because
an Order to Show Cause proceeding was never initiated by the Respondent. The Respondent
failed to comply with this prior directive of the Court to file for such relief. (Record p. 135;
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Addendum No. 19, p. 117).
The provisions of UCA §78-32-12.1 only apply where there is a "refusal" by an
obligor to pay child support. In this case, there are no Findings of Fact made which shows
that the father "refused" to pay his child support. Indeed, the evidence was that the paternal
grandparents stepped in and made six (7) or seven (7) of such payments on behalf of their
son for a short period of time. (Addendum No. 8, pp. 54-59; Trial Transcript pp. 22-23,3132).
The Citing Court Must Have Jurisdiction Over the Party
and Subject Matter Before Contempt can be Imposed on a Party.
Any Court that is asked to determine an issue of contempt cannot impose a contempt
sanction until it has obtained personal jurisdiction over the party and has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. USA v. Larry Dickinson 465 F.2d 496 (CA-5 1972); Bernard
Olcott v. Delaware Flood Co. 76 F.3d 1538(CA-10 1996). These are the two (2) preliminary
matters that must be satisfied before the Court can proceed to adjudicate any contempt
matters. As a procedural matter, the Court did not obtain jurisdiction over the Petitioner as
to this specific claim. This is an error of law. The Court had previously ruled that if
contempt was an issue, then an Order to Show Cause proceeding had to be filed. (Record
pp. 134-135; Addendum No. 19, pp. 116-119).
In this case, there was no separate filing for a finding of contempt. The procedure for
determining a party's contempt status is made by means of an Order to Show Cause. The
Court directed that such a procedure be followed. No such order was sought or issued by the
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Court.
In this case, no Affidavit seeking contempt was filed and served upon the Petitioner
in advance of the trial. The contempt issue was raised on the merits for the first time during
closing argument of the case.
The law treats a contempt proceeding as a new or an independent proceeding which
is apart from the underlying case. Therefore, some form of personal service on the party is
absolutely necessary. J.W. Jones v. LeRov H. Cox 84 Ut. 568, 37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934);
Utah Power and Light v. Richmond Irrigation Comp. 80 Utah 105,13 P.2d320 (Utah 1932).
A contempt matter is often referred to as a "case within the pending case".
The Court must determine that in cases dealing with contempt that the person so
charged was properly served with specific notice of the assertion of the contempt charges.
Celeste Bott v. Mary Bott 20 Ut.2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (Utah 1968) (reversing contempt
citation due to lack of a supporting affidavit). This would mean that the nominal Defendant,
who is charged with the contempt claim, must be personally served the Affidavit or the
initiating pleading which alleges the specific illegal acts constituting the alleged contempt.
J.W. Jones v. LeRov H. Cox 84 Ut. 568,37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934); Celeste Bott v. Marv Bott
20 Ut.2d 329,437 P.2d 684 (Utah 1968). The Affidavit takes the place of a Complaint and
until such has been properly served upon the nominal Defendant, the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the Defendant as far as the contempt proceedings are concerned. J.W. Jones
v.LeRovH.Cox 84 Ut. 568,37 P.2d 777 (Utah 1934). A contempt matter is a separate legal
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proceeding and is apart from the principal action. In order for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person, it is necessary that an Affidavit or the initiating pleading be filed
and then served upon the nominal Defendant. Maureen Burgers v. William Maiben 652 P.2d
1320 (Utah 1982); James Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden 185 P.2d 256 (Utah
1947); UCA §78-32-3; Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The party asserting contempt of Court must make and file of record specific charges
of the same under oath. Herald-Republican Publishing Co. v. Lewis 42 Ut. 188, 129 P. 624
(Utah 1912). The acts as stated in the complaining Affidavit must make out a prima facie
case of contempt based upon admissible evidence. The affidavits must be fact intensive and
not mere statements of the witness' personal conclusions. Gunnison Irrigation Comp. v.
Charles P. Peterson 74 Utah 460,280 P.715 (Utah 1929); Celeste Bott v. MarvBott 20 Ut.2d
329, 437 P.2d 684 (Utah 1968).
Notice of the commencement of contempt proceedings is most often initiated by
personal service of the Order to Show Cause on the nominal Defendant. Maureen Burgers
v.William Maiben 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a specific motion be filed
with the Court in writing in order to obtain an Order to Show Cause. Rule 7(b)(1). Service
of the Order to Show Cause can be made either personally or (where a party is hiding from
the sheriff) upon the attorney of record for the party. Bruno D'Aston v. Dorothy D'Aston
790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (personal service on the attorney of record was valid for
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an Order to Show Cause as to a claim of civil contempt where the party was shown to be
evading service of legal process).
A conviction of contempt (including any sanctions) will be reversed or vacated if it
is obtained in part as the result of procedural irregularities.

State of Utah v. Arden M.

Barlow 771 P.2d 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This has occurred in this case. In addition, it
is not even clear what statute the Respondent relies upon in asserting the contempt claim.
Rule 4-102(2)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration (in effect at that time)
provides that an Order to Show cause shall be served at least five (5) days prior to any
scheduled hearing on the issues raised. The rule further provides that the "return of service"
on the Order to Show Cause must be filed with the Clerk of the Court at least two (2) days
prior to the scheduled hearing. Rule 4-102(2)(B) (second sentence).
The purpose of the contempt statute is two-fold. First, it is intended to inform the
person of the specific charges. Second, to inform the Court of the claim of contempt.
Tommie M. Brown v. Ronald G. Cook 123 Ut. 505, 260 P.2d 544 (Utah 1953); In Re:
Schulder 62 Ut. 591, 221 P. 565 (Utah 1923). This has been the law of the state of Utah
since the 19th Century. Emeline Young v. George O. Cannon 2 Utah 560 (1880).
Because no Order to Show Cause proceeding was commenced, the contempt matter
must be reversed and the judgment vacated.
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The Trial Court Erred in its Determination that the
Petitioner Was in Contempt Since the Respondent Failed to
Establish all the Required Elements of Contempt.
In order for a person to be guilty of a civil contempt charge, there must be: (i) an
underlying Order of the Court which is lawful, and (ii) the party's actual conduct in violating
the Order must constitute contempt of the power or the authority of the Court. These are the
two (2) basic and central issues involving contempt of Court under both state and federal law.
USAv. State of Connecticut 931 F.Supp 974 (DC Conn. 1996); Pearl C. Foreman v. Otto C.
Foreman 111 Ut. 72, 176 P.2d 144 (Utah 1946); 17 AmJur.2d Contempt §1.
As a general proposition, a mere violation of an Order or Decree of the Court cannot
be the factual basis for a contempt citation. There must be shown that the conduct
complained about included an element of disdain for the power and authority of the Court.
USAv. Gregory Robinson 922 F.2d 1531 (CA-11 1991); Household Bank v. Allan Ross 148
Misc.2d 841, 562 NYS.2d 373 (1990) (no intent to impair or to impede the Order of the
Court); Harriette Williams Downey v. Michael A. Clauder 30 F.3d 681 (CA-6 1994) (lack
of spite towards the Court and good faith attempt to comply with the Order in question);
Douglas Priorv. State of Florida 562 So.2d 864 (Fla. Ct.App. 1990) (the conduct complained
or did not display any disdain for the Court's legal authority).
As a general rule, there must be present in the facts (either expressly or by
implication) an intent to affront the authority of the Court by the specific conduct complained
of. USA v. Keith Engstrom 16 F.3d 1006 (CA-9 1994); Fred P. Gilbert v. State 648 P.2d
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1226 (Okla. Crm.App. 1982); William Pounders v. Penelope Watson 521 US 982,117 S.Ct.
2359, 138 L.Ed.2d 976 (1997) (advocacy which is fearless, vigorous, and effective, but
which is not disruptive conduct is not an act of contempt); Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins
Environmental Services, Inc. 893 F.2d 605 (CA-3 1990) (conduct not defiant of or to the
Court is not contemptuous). 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt §1, §2, and §36.
The proof of the basic elements of contempt and the intent to affront the Court
remains with the moving party. The Court failed to make findings of fact on all of the
elements of the claim and the intent of the Petitioner to defy the Court's orders.
Contempt of Court Involves Specific Findings Relating
to Three (3) Basic Aspects of the Order in Question.
When a Court considers a charge of contempt, it must: First, determine that the
person knew of the Court's Order and that he understood the order. Second, it must be shown
that the person had the ability to comply with the Court's original Order or the specific Order
in question. Third, it must be shown that the person willfully and knowingly refused to
comply with the Order. June M. Thomas v. Harry E. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977);
Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Garth N. Labrum 762 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1988); David
Brown v. State of Flordia 579 So.2d 898 (Fla. Ct.App. 1991); USA v. Terry W. Hollowav
789 F.Supp 957 (DC ND Ind. 1992).
The Court must specifically find as a matter of fact that the person charged with
contempt: (i) knew of the duty imposed by the Court's Order, (ii) had the present ability to
comply with the Order, and (iii) willfully and knowingly refused to comply with the Court's
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Order. The Trial Court must make specific Findings of Fact about all of these factors in
order for the findings of contempt to be upheld on appeal. In Re: John W. Hoover 44 Ut.
476, 141 P. 101 (Utah 1920); June M. Thomas v. Harry E. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah
1977).
The Findings of Fact must be made on all of the elements of the claim or it is
reversible error. State v. Don Bartholomew 85 Ut. 94, 38 P.2d 753 (Utah 1934).
The Court's only Finding as it relates to the issue of contempt is found in ^|23.
(Record p. 401; Addendum No. 5, p. 27A). This is insufficient as a matter of law.
A person's due diligence and bona fide efforts to comply with the Order is complete
defense to any claim of contempt. A person, who puts forth every reasonable effort to
comply with a Court Order, is not guilty of contempt of Court. Gwennavera T. Limb v.
Edward T. Limb 113 Ut. 385, 195 P.2d 263 (Utah 1948); Barbara L. Jeppson v. Charles B.
Jeppson 597 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1979).
There is no findings made by the Court as to the evidence relating to the Petitioner's
defense to the claim.
Inability to Comply with an Order of a Court
is a Complete Defense to a Contempt Charge.
A person, who puts forth every reasonable effort to comply with an Order of the
Court, but who is still unable to do so, is not guilty of contempt. 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt
$161: GwennaveraT. Limb v. EdwardT. Limb 113 Ut. 385.195 P.2d263 (Utah 1948); Fave
W. Osmus v. Harry Osmus 114 Ut. 216, 198 P.2d 233 (Utah 1948); State v. Don
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Bartholomew 85 Ut. 94, 38 P.2d 753 (Utah 1934). Mere noncompliance with an Order of
the Court is not "per se" contempt.
The burden of proving the defense of inability to comply rests with the claimant.
Tommie M. Brown v. Ronald G. Cook 123 Ut. 505, 260 P.2d 544 (Utah 1953); Daniel
Johansenv. State 491 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1971); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt §161.
In this case, the Petitioner has clearly established a defense to the claim of contempt.
This does not mean the accrued child support, as initially ordered, is forgiven. This is not
the Petitioner's position. The contempt is not warranted.
Proof of Civil Contempt Must be Based
on Clear and Convincing Evidence of Guilt.
As a general rule, contempt must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. David
Sinclair v. Lorraine Sinclair 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986): Marilyn J. Kelly v. Ronald S. Dranev
754 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.App. 1988); Billie J. Coleman v. Harold S. Coleman 664 P.2d 1155
(Utah 1983).
The finding of contempt must be supported by clear and convincing proof as to each
element of the charge. Billie J. Coleman v. Harold S. Coleman 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983);
June M. Thomas v. Harry E. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977); David Sinclair v. Lorraine
Sinclair 718 P.2d 396 (Utah 1986); Marilyn J. Kelly v. Ronald S. Dranev 754 P.2d 92 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988). The Findings of Fact must go to each and every element of the contempt
charge. Charles R. Parish v. Oscar W. McConkie 84 Ut. 396, 35 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1934).
The Findings of Fact of the Court must be in writing. Hillyard v. District Court 68
-38-

Ut. 220, 249 P. 806 (Utah 1926); In Re: Parley F. Gerber's Estate 83 Ut. 441, 29 P.2d 932
(Utah 1934); State of Utah v. Arden M. Barlow 771 P.2d 662 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (no
written findings of fact were made and filed); John G. Powers v. Marvin S. Taylor 14 Ut.2d
118, 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963). The evidence in this case does not support a claim of
contempt by clear and convincing evidence.
Under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is obligated to prepare
written Findings of Fact and oral statements as to the Court's findings in the case is generally
insufficient when contempt is raised. Tommie M. Brown v. Ronald G. Cook 123 Ut. 505,
260 P.2d 544 (Utah 1953).
The evidence, in this case, does not support a claim of contempt by clear and
convincing evidence.
The Issue of Contempt Cannot be Determined
in the Absence of a Hearing on the Merits.
The party accused of contempt is entitled to a hearing on the asserted charge. Stacie
R. Stallings Smith v. Robert Smith 839 P.2d 685 (Okla. Ct.App. 1992). This is necessary in
order to afford the party "due process" of law. Milton Gidden v. State 613 So.2d 457 (Fla.
1993). In this case, the claim was not made in advance of the trial. It was made after the
trial. This is procedurally in error. The contempt hearing was never scheduled because an
Order to Show Cause was never issued.
The text of UCA §78-32-9 reads as follows:
When the person arrested has been brought up or has appeared the court or
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judge must proceed to investigate the charge, and must hear any answer which
the person arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses for or
against him; for which an adjournment may be had from time to time, if
necessary. (Emphasis added.)
Before a person can be found in contempt, he must be given a hearing on the issue in
order to afford the party "due process" of law. Maureen Burgers v. William Maiben 652
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
A Citation of Contempt is Reviewed by an Appeals Court
Under the Abuse of Discretion Standard as to the Merits.
Contempt is an equitable remedy reviewable by an Appellate Court for an abuse of
discretion as to whether or not the person is contemptuous. Florence McKay v. Earl McKay
13 Ut. 187, 370 P.2d 358 (Utah 1962).
The Appeal Should Not Be Dismissed Due To
Wilful Disobedience of a Court Order.
The Court of Appeals has directed that the issue of the dismissal of the appeal on
account of the Petitioner's failure to pay support be addressed in the Appellant's initial Brief.
The rule of law, which has been applied, is that a civil appeal may be dismissed where
the Appellant is in defiance of the existing lawful Orders of the Court entered in the same
case. Bruno D'Aston v. Dorothy D'Aston 790 P.2d 590 (Ut. Ct.App 1990). This is a
discretionary rule and is not a per se rule of law.
The rule should not be applied in this case for the following reasons:
1.

The default is not wilful or unintentional.

2.

The default was not meant to defy the Court's authority.
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3.

The Appellant illness was not unintentional. The illness rendered him
incapable of paying the support.

4.

The parents of the Appellant made payments for an on behalf of their son
though they were specially designated by them to be to any specific order of
support.

5.

The large support Order is unlawful for reasons stated in the Brief.

The rule of law has generally been applied when the actions of the Appellant are
intentional or wilful. Not every violation of an existing Court order amounts to contempt
sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the case.
The paternal grandparents stepped in and tried to help support the children. They
made six (7) or seven (7) payments totaling $907.00 in US Dollars. (Trial Transcript pp. 22,
31, and 50). The mother did not cash them when presented. She held the checks for months
and then deposited the checks in a lump sum. (Trial Transcript p. 120).
The initial temporary support was not scheduled for a hearing until November 16,
2000, which is after the mental illness had become severe. (Record pp. 68-71; Addendum
No. 18, pp. 111 -115). As part of the initial Order, not monthly child support was fixed. The
Petitioner agreed to pay in a lump sum $2000.00 within seven (7) days. He did not do so.
Instead, the paternal grandparents made the payments on behalf of their son.
In a later proceeding held on January 10, 2001, the Court entered an Order for
monthly child support to be paid in the sum of $394.00 per month. (Record pp. 134-137;
Addendum No. 19, pp. 116-119). The Court specifically ruled that the issue of any
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noncompliance with a Support Order must be brought to the Court's attention, via. an Order
to Show Cause proceeding. (See f3 of the Order).
IX. CONCLUSION
The Court committed error as a matter of law:
1.

When it rejected the testimony of Dr. Kotkas as to the present occupational

impairment of the Petitioner.
2.

When it set the child support level at $ 1,239.00 per month by misapplying the

governing law and failing to make the necessary comparisons. The Court found that it had
insufficient evidence to make the comparison.
3.

When it entered a finding of contempt and awarded attorney's fees when the

Respondent failed to initiate an Order to Show Cause proceeding as required by the prior
Order of the Court and when she failed to have the Petitioner served with the initiating
pleadings.
4.

Entered a money judgment for contribution when the Respondent has not paid

the expenses and had not paid the expense in excess of his allocable share.
5.

The contempt citation was not based upon adequate Findings of Fact.

6.

The amount of the child support award exceeds more than 50% of the

Petitioner's current disposable income.
7.

The Court retroactively entered a significantly larger child support obligation.

8.

The present appeal should not be dismissed. The Petitioner's conduct is not
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in defiance of the Court's authority.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2004.
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